'outsiders' with a highly ambivalent attitude towards the values of their adopted academic milieu.
This ambivalence is both reflected in and a reflection of their approach to the study of anthropology. (Leach, 1984: 11.) This is the crux, in Leach's view. He argued that the uncomfortable situation of the outsiders recruited by Malinowski explained their theoretical orientation. Yearning for security, they were seduced by the Oxbridge ideal of a stable British hierarchical society. Durkheim apparently believed that everything worked very nicely in properly integrated societies, where people shared the same values. So the outsiders became orthodox Durkheimians. In contrast, upper-middle class British recruits to anthropology (including E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Gregory Bateson, Camilla Wedgwood, Audrey Richards, Lucy Mair, and Leach himself) were rebels against their class. Leach speculated that they had been attracted to ethnographic research because they 'were trying to get away from a homeland which they found archaic'. (Leach, 1984: 12. ) Sceptical insiders, they did not believe in any grand theories of social cohesion. They took it for granted that every establishment was out to manipulate everyone else.
An historian, Henrika Kuklick, has echoed Leach's class analysis, though without citing him (Kuklick,1991: 72-3) , but these speculations, typical of the gossip about their elders and betters that anthropologists swap in pubs, after their seminars, with a mixture of reverence and schadenfreude, fall apart immediately they are scrutinised with any care. Were Audrey Richards and Lucy Mair insiders, because of their social class, or outsiders because they were women in the academic world of the 1930s and 1940s? Did Radcliffe-Brown's social insecurity (if indeed he did feel insecure) explain his attraction towards Kropotkin's anarchism, or rather towards Durkheim's corporate socialism? Leach's propotypical insider, Evans-Pritchard, was an orthodox Durheimian before World War II. Schapera, one of Leach's outsiders, was always sceptical of social theory. And if the analysis were true, it would be hard to understand how Leach himself became a great fan of structuralism in the 1960s. (As so often, Leach may have been generalising from his immediate situation in the small Cambridge department of social anthropology, where he and the increasingly conservative Meyer Fortes were embattled rivals in the 1960s and early 1970s.) III A rival alternative history emerged in the 1970s, taking a lead from Franz Fanon and Edward Said. Social anthropology was a colonial science, a form of Orientalism, 'a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient ' (Said, 1978: 95) . This proposition is now taken for granted by many students (and quite a few American anthropologists). However, a number of authors have pointed to the anti-colonialism of certain leading anthropologists, the contemptuous rejection of anthropological expertise by some colonial governors and high officials. Several of the South African anthropologists who entered British anthropology brought with them a thorough-going critique of colonialism. (Kuper, 1999(b) .) A more persuasive objection is that British anthropologists often endorsed the mandarin preference for pure science, uncontaminated by policy concerns, a view expressed in particular by Evans-Pritchard and Leach but preached in the 1950s even by Fortes and Gluckman, who had been among the partisans of applied research in the 1930s and 1940s.
By and large, recent historians have resisted the designation of social anthropology as a colonial science. (See, e.g., Goody, 1995.) George Stocking's very lengthy history of modern British social anthropology, After Tylor (1995), devotes only part of one chapter to the colonial context, amounting to only some 20 pages in a work running to 570 pages in all. Few reviewers of Stocking's book seem to have found this at all odd. But clearly this refusal to engage with the colonial context will not do either. As BenoÓt de L'Estoile writes, 'What needs to be addressed … is precisely what is meant by anthropological knowledge being a "colonial science". We need to understand the specific historical configuration in which some discourses and practices could be held as "scientific", while at the same time (De L'Estoile, 2004 (b) ), De L'Estoile protests against the juxtoposition of an independent science of anthropology with another supposedly distinct entity termed colonialism. He also criticises the conventional opposition between pure science and compromised and compromising applied studies. Rather he argues that beginning in the late 1920s, British social anthropology was effectively reconstituted. This happened by way of social and intellectual exchanges between academic anthropologists, other intellectuals, missionaries, and colonial policymakers. And de L'Estoile describes a second and more fundamental Malinowskian revolution that occurred in the 1930s, as Malinowski drew his students into a dialogue with the leading policy-makers who were concerned with Britain's African empire.
This story begins with the formation of the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures in 1926. Initially dominated by missionary societies, the IIALC concerned itself at first particularly with linguistics, which was crucial to bible translation, and to education. However, its moving spirits recast its programme as they appealed for funds. The key actor here was J. anthropology was criticised more commonly in the 1930s and 1940s for ignoring social change and failing to analyse the colonial context. Its defenders pointed out that on the contrary functionalists produced a number of studies of local government, migrant labour, land tenure, the work of the courts, and so on, and that there were several attempts at developing a theory of social change. However, such studies came to be considered as constituting a special category, termed 'applied' work. After World War II the academic purists stigmatised this sort of research as being less scientific and prestigious than what came to termed 'theoretical' studies. An ostentatious refusal to analyse the colonial context became the hallmark of theoretical contributions in social anthropology, because any acknowledgement of colonial realities would mean engaging directly, rather than implicitly, in debates on colonial policy. Yet African Political Systems unwittingly proved that the colonial context did in fact determine the units of study, the tribes. Colonial preoccupations also made certain topics seem naturally more important than others.
Not only were anthropologists drawn to the study of tribal political systems or law. Policies on religion, education, and the family were generally delegated by African colonial governments to missionary societies. In response, anthropologists made applied studies of Christian influences, the economics of bride-price, or the impact of migrant labour on family life. They also undertook 'theoretical studies' on the same institutional complexes, but these were ostentatiously pure in thought, dealing with initiation ceremonies, traditional religion, witchcraft, kinship taboos and lineage systems. No missionaries appeared in these 'theoretical' texts, except as straw men who took a moralising view of African practices.
IV
In the 1940s and 1950s, the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute under Godfrey Wilson, and later Max Gluckman, and the East African Institute of Social Research, under Audrey Richards, were mature embodiments of applied anthropology in Africa. They represented the apotheosis of Malinowski's project. But Africa was changing. As colonial policy-makers looked forward to the independence of African states, the anthropologists were sidelined. At the LSE Lucy Mair tried to turn applied anthropology into development studies, but applied studies were effectively extruded from departments of social anthropology in British universities after the African empire came to an end in the mid-1960s. Within the university departments, the purists won out.
At this critical juncture, the social anthropologists began to lose ground within the British universities.
Britain's system of higher education entered a phase of rapid expansion in the 1960s, but social anthropology stagnated institutionally. Given the requisite political will on the part of the leading anthropologists, it might have been possible to establish a number of new departments of social anthropology as the universities expanded and new ones were founded. A particular growth area was social science. Sociology became a popular subject and established itself in all the new universities. Social anthropology, however, remained a small elitist discipline, positioned most securely at Oxford, Cambridge and the LSE. Given Leach's thesis about the nature of British science, this might be regarded as a plus point, but it froze the institutional development of the discipline. By the 1970s, when Malinowski's students retired, there were about 150 academic social anthropologists in Britain, and the figure remained As the institutional basis of the discipline within the universities stagnated, and even began to shrink in the 1980s, the decade of the 'cuts', the collective institutions of British social anthropology became bastions of conservatism, not to say reaction. (See Mills, 2003 (b) .) The anthropology sub-committee of the Social Science Research Council, the Royal Anthropological Institute, the Association of Social Anthropologists, the anthropological section of the British Academy, all remained under the control of a few increasingly elderly professors. Raymond Firth was calling the shots in most of these institutions when he was well into his eighties, and his close ally Edmund Leach remained a key player until his death, although he had insisted in his Reith Lectures that in our 'runaway world' 'no one should be allowed to hold any kind of responsible administrative office once he has passed the age of 55'. (Leach, 1968.) Having lost an empire, the social anthropologists found themselves struggling in this dismal institutional environment to find a role. And just at this moment they were challenged on their own turf, within the universities. Hamstrung by the sclerotic institutional structure of the profession, they were confronted by the rise of development studies and of sociology. The anthropologists naturally refused to be drawn into development studies, which moved into the space that had been vacated by the old colonial science. Third world development projects provided the infrastructure and ideological impetus for a fresh surge of social anthropology in Scandinavia and in the German-speaking countries, while in the Netherlands new departments of 'Non-Western sociology' split off from the old departments of ethnology in order to tap the generous funds being made available by the Dutch government for overseas 'development projects'. In Britain, however, any anthropologist who specialised in development studies would be unlikely to find encouragement, or employment, in departments of social anthropology. (See Grillo, 1985 .)
The rise of sociology presented a more alarming challenge. At Oxford and Cambridge the professors were frankly terrified that their students would desert en masse to this more radical and more relevant came the Bethnall Green studies of Peter Wilmott and Michael Young. These men were all social reformers, attuned to the issues facing the politicians. Young had been secretary of the Labour Party's research department in the run-up to the general election of 1945, the election that opened the way for the implementation of Beveridge's welfare plans. But they also operated outside academia. As sociology consolidated its base within the universities, the leading sociologists pronounced that community studies were unreliable. Scientific research required large surveys and statistical evidence.
But nor did this tradition of urban, British ethnography attract the anthropologists. Evans-Pritchard denounced Malinowski as 'a bloody gas-bag' because he looked kindly on 'the mass-observation bilge'. The leading anthropologists also stuck with the traditional subjects of 'pure' research: kinship and ritual. The advent of structuralism gave a fresh impetus to these fields of study, but anthropologists paid little attention to new intellectual movements in the other social sciences. And the methods of field research remained those associated with Malinowski, at least in the mythology.
And so, by and large, the British anthropologists beat a retreat in the face of sociology. They distanced themselves from issues of public interest. And increasingly they tended to redefine their project as the study of cultural variation. They chose to study isolated, traditional, if perhaps no longer 'primitive' societies, and even anthropologists working in societies undergoing revolutionary changes in India, China, Yet whatever the response, turning outwards or inwards, there has been a recurrent feeling that anthropologists had something distinctive to say, if only they could be sure what it was. Worrying about this question, anthropologists commonly appeal to the magic of their methods, and denounce the debasement of ethnography in cultural studies, science studies, or urban sociology. More positively, they may reposition themselves within one of the enduring anthropological paradigms that can be traced, not unchanging but remarkably stable, through a century of transformations. The discipline has its own distinctive DNA. Each gene has its prescribed place, and also its particular code word: evolution, culture or society. And each finds its fullest expression in a different disciplinary environment. It may be conceived of as a branch of biology, a discipline at home within the humanities, or as a social science.
European social anthropology traditionally conceived of itself as a social science. In the 1970s, American anthropology became polarised between a hardline biological determinism, most powerfully manifested in sociobiology, and Geertz's paradigm of a humanistic study in pursuit of 'meaning'. Geertz's revolution was aimed against both the four-fields scientific anthropology of the old school and against the sociological anthropology of the Parsonians, to which he had once himself adhered. In his recent memoir
After the Fact, Geertz reflect that 'the move towards meaning' had 'proved a proper revolution: sweeping, durable, turbulent, and consequential'. (Geertz, 1995: 115) In the past two decades, it has certainly been the dominant influence in American anthropology.
American influence came to predominate in all the sciences and social sciences after the War, and together from all over Europe and agreed that they faced similar dilemmas, confronted the same pressures, faced common choices. We set out to establish a new institutional space, and we situated our project within the European social science tradition.
How are we doing? Rereading the papers published in the first decade of our journal Social Anthropology, I am struck most particularly by the modesty and eclecticism of the arguments that are presented. The grand theories of the previous decades are seldom invoked, yet the authors have read widely and reflectively, and they refer as a matter of course to sociologists, historians or psychologists.
Their arguments are closely tied to detailed ethnographic observations. These ethnographic descriptions themselves present a remarkable though taken-for-granted contrast to the images presented in the literature of the previous generation. Few papers describe apparently isolated, bounded, traditional, monocultural societies. Rather, even the most exotic communities are presented as part of the wider world, the site of intellectual and political cross-currents, internally riven by conflict and echoing to debates and dissension.
Nor are their inhabitants mysteriously, or enchantingly, 'other'. Magic and religion often appear to be no less pragmatic than bio-medicine. Adepts of strange cults turn out to be no less reasonable than ourselves.
In order to make sense of their world, even the most conservative and apparently isolated people appeal to European character, is alive and well, and certainly in better shape than it was when we first planned the EASA. Perhaps we can claim some of the credit. But I suspect that there is still too much faith in the magic of ethnography, that not enough time is spent on following the big debates in the social sciences, and that too little serious research is directed to the public issues which absorb European intellectuals.
There is a popular slogan, that we should make the unfamiliar familiar, the familiar strange. That can all too easily become just another way of saying that we are peddling exotica. If we accept this role as the specialists in strange things we condemn ourselves to the margins, and concede that anthropology must be at best the science of the marginal.
And finally, there is surely too little investment in comparison. This is the perspective that anthropology is best placed to contribute to social science debates, and it is the most fruitful method with which to probe theories and generalisations advanced not only within anthropology but also by This does not necessarily mean that, like Malinowski, we should seek 'laws and regularities', although it would be nice to find them. But we should try to extend the range of the social sciences by testing them in other conditions, bringing back home an appreciation of social processes and views of the world that are ignored by the ethnocentric sociologists, political scientists and psychologists. For we must not only listen to other social scientists, we must talk back to them, introducing into their debates the models we have learnt in our interactions with all sorts of people around the world. And we must not just grumble about public policies on immigration and multiculturalism, or turn up our noses at projects of development. We must address them.
